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Jurisdictional Statement 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)0). 
Issues on appeal 
Appellant intends to assert the following issue on appeal: 
Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that a roadway 
crossing Appellant's land had been dedicated and abandoned to the 
use of the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104(1), given the 
Court's factual finding that Appellant's predecessor in interest had 
physically blocked the roadway for a 24 hour period and remained 
present at such blockade every seven years from the road's 
construction to the time of hearing. 
Standard of review 
Application of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) must be 
supported by clear and convincing evidence, AWINC v. Simonsen 2005 
UT App 168,117, 112 P.3d 1228. Application of law under Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-5-104(1) is reviewed for correctness IcU at 1)8. However' in 
application of the facts to the statute, the trial court is granted 
1 
significant discretion, State v. Six Mile ranch Co. 2006 UT App 104, ^9, 
132 P.3d 687. 
Determinative law 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) governs the specific issue 
presented. 
Statement of the Case 
On February 23, 2006 the Town of Leeds filed a complaint 
asking that the court declare the roadway traversing Appellant's 
property had been abandoned to the public pursuant to UCA § 72-5-
104(1). R 1-6. The matter was heard with testimony from relevant 
witnesses on motion for preliminary injunction March 28, 2006 (R 198) 
and continued with further hearing on May 4,2006. R 197. The Court 
made oral findings of fact at that time. R 197, transcript P. 211-213. 
After further briefing and argument on July 20, 2006 the court ruled 
from the bench that the road had been abandoned to public use. R 
196, transcript p. 21-22. Pursuant to the stipulation of counsel, the 
evidentiary hearings were consolidated with (and considered as) trial 
on the merits. R 178-179, V-
After the appearance of Appellant's current counsel, R 167, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered 
9 
October 27, 2006. R 173-179. Notice of Appeal was filed November 
16, 2004. R 183. 
Statement of Facts 
Within the Town of Leeds there exists a roadway named 
West Center Street ("West Center Street") originating at an 
intersection with Main Street (Old Highway 91) and extending North to 
the crest of a small incline, then down hill across certain real property 
currently owned by the Defendant (the "Subject Property") to a narrow 
"Box" underpass underneath Interstate 15 to an area known as Angel 
Springs. Findings of Fact, R 176 HI. The roadway is 10 feet wide 
where it passes under the free way. R 198 Transcript p 8. The roadway 
after it ceases being center street (at least according to Appellant's 
position) as it crosses Appellant's property is at most 14 feet wide and 
at some places less than that. R 197 Transcript p 185.1 The Box 
underpass was constructed at the same time that Interstate 15 was 
constructed in 1964-65 at which time West Center Street was 
repositioned to its present location. Findings of Fact, R 176 1)2. 
Mrs. Joann George and her family owned the Subject 
Property prior to Appellant's purchase in approximately 2000. Findings 
1
 The record is not clear on the length of the roadway in question. 
Exhibit 7 is the only picture of the roadway. Appellant believes the 
portion crossing his property is approximately 600 feet long. 
3 
of Fact, R 176 H3. In October of every year for seven years, beginning 
in October of 1964, and again in October of 1971, 1978, 1985, 1992, 
and finally in 1999, Mrs. George, either solo or with the assistance of 
her sons, went to the roadway in question and established a roadblock 
for twenty-four hours. Findings of Fact, R 176 1|4. The roadblocks 
generally consisted of her or her sons' physical presence and 
placement of sawhorses across the road. Findings of Fact, R 176 1|5. 
With the exception of the 24-hour roadblocks, from 1966 
until 1996 this road was open, unblocked and available to the public 
without any inhibition of travel with possible exception of times during 
sorghum boiling2 at a local processing plant near the road. Findings of 
Fact, R 176 H6. See also testimony of Joanne George R 197 transcript 
p. 162-166. Joanne George also testified that she placed "no 
trespassing" signs on the blockade. R 197, transcript p. 163.3 The 
express reason for blocking the road was to retain ownership. R 197, 
transcript p. 169.4 
2
 Various witnesses testified that at times the "church" boiled sorghum 
on what is now appellant's property at various times during the years 
in question. Some witnesses opined that the road may have been 
closed to prevent dust. 
3
 See addendum for copy of testimony. 
4
 See addendum for copy of testimony. 
4 
During her 24-hour road blockades, Mrs. George (with the 
exception of an adjacent landowner5) never encountered anyone in the 
process and did not testify that she knew of anyone who was 
precluded from traveling along the road because of her blockades. 
Findings of Fact, R 176 1)7. From 1966 through 1996, members of the 
public used West Center Street whenever they wished and without the 
need of obtaining permission. Findings of Fact, R 176 H8. Such use 
was light enough that it did not apparently coincide with the 
roadblocks. 
After his purchase in 2000 and before the commencement 
of the action by Appellee (February 2006), Appellant attempted to 
restrict travel across the road by erecting a chain link fence across the 
road at the southernmost edge of the Subject Property and at the 
entrance into the "Box" tunnel. Findings of Fact, R 176 U9. Appellant 
also affixed two no trespassing signs on the chain link fence. 
Complaint R 1-6. 
As a result of Defendant's actions, the Town of Leeds filed 
an action seeking to have West Center Street deemed a dedicated 
public right of way pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1), and 
5
 Elaine Cuff testified that she saw Mrs. George's blockade in 1999. R. 
198 transcript p.27. 
5 
sought a temporary restraining order and injunction enjoining 
appellant from obstructing the roadway. Findings of Fact, R 176 flll. 
Summary of Argument 
The Trial Court made a clear factual finding that the owner 
of the roadway in question blocked the same for a 24-hour period 
every seven years from the road's creation to 1999 (the roadway was 
again blocked by Appellant after his purchase in 2000). Under the 
holdings of a series of Utah Supreme Court cases, because the road 
was blocked it was not in continuous use and not dedicated or 
abandoned to public use under UCA 72-5-104(1). Specifically, the 
approach of balancing the amount and scope of public use against the 
nature and length of closure under the recent case of Wasatch County 
v. Okelberrv, 2006 UT App 473, 556 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 
2006), should be rejected. 
Further, inferred intent of the land owner to abandon the 
roadway to public use is still a requirement to a finding of dedication of 
the roadway to public use. The owner's actions in closing the roadway 
every seven years to prevent such dedication, as a matter of law, 
preclude an inference of such intent. 
6 
Finally, the periodic closures and reopening of the roadway 
require the conclusion that the public use of the roadway was 
permissive. Because the use was permissive, it was not used as a 
"public thoroughfare" and no dedication to the public results. 
Argument 
The Public Use of the Roadway in Question Was Not 
Continuous. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) states, "A highway is 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Heber City v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307, 310 
(Utah 1997), reiterated the elements for a finding of public dedication 
under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). [TJhere must be (/') continuous 
use, (//') as a public thoroughfare, (//'/') for a period of ten years. Citing 
Bover v. Clark. 326 P.2d 107, 311(Utah 1958), the Supreme Court 
explained that "continuous use" is found when "the public [makes] a 
continuous and uninterrupted use of the . . . [r]oad as they found it 
convenient and necessary. This Court has cited Heber Citv. Supra, and 
Boyer. supra for the same proposition. See Awinc v. Simpson. 2005 UT 
7 
App 168 at U l l . In Department of Natural Resources v. Butler, 2006 
UT App 444, this court by implication agreed that actually barring 
travel by the public prevents a finding of continuous use. In discussing 
the use of gates they stated: 
[T]he court held that the gates in question were generally 
unlocked from about 1925 until 1980 and were used merely to restrict 
the travel of livestock, not people. . . . We therefore agree with the 
trial court's conclusion that the Road was in continuous use by the 
public for an extended period of time. 
Id. at 1)15. Appellant maintains that the Trial Court's 
finding that the roadway was blocked for a 24 hour period every seven 
years prevents the legal conclusion that the public's use was 
"continuous" for purposes of public dedication.6 The standard rule for 
statutory construction was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Holms, 2006 Utah 31 , held: 
" [0]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect 
to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of 
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Foutz v. City of S. 
Jordan, 2004 UT 75, H 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly 
6
 The only Utah Supreme Court case that could possibly suggest that 
barring the roadway would not prevent a finding of continuous use is 
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981), where the court 
noted that the road had "periodically been blocked to facilitate the 
movement of sheep. Unlike the present case there was apparently no 
finding of when the roadway was blocked during the more than 20 
years of testified use. Also, the blocking the road to move sheep has 
no implications to intent or acquiescence in the dedication. For 
argument regarding the intent of the owner in blocking the roadway, 
see infra. 
s 
and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning." C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, H 9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), 
Id. at H16. The plain ordinary meaning of the term 
"continuous use" is use without interruption.7 Appellant acknowledges 
that to be continuous the use need not be constant. Indeed even the 
most heavily traveled roadway may have periods of time where no one 
passes. However to be continuous it must not be interrupted. In 
Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct App. 
1998), this court summarized the test for continuous use as previously 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court: 
In Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (Utah 
1958), the supreme court concluded there had been continuous and 
uninterrupted use of a road over ten years where "the public, even 
though not consisting of a great many persons, made a continuous 
and uninterrupted use ... as often as they found it convenient or 
necessary." Id. at 109. Similarly, in Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1977), the supreme court stated that, "use may be 
continuous though not constant.... provided it occurred as often as 
the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is not 
interruption." Id. at 949 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Finally, 
in Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 311, the supreme court found 
continuous use of a road where the evidence at trial demonstrated that 
the public "made a continuous and uninterrupted use of the road "as 
often as they found it convenient or necessary." 
Under Utah law, use need not be regular to be continuous. 
Even infrequent use can result in dedication of a road as a public 
thoroughfare. However, under the continuous use requirement, 
members of the public must have been able to use the road whenever 
they found it necessary or convenient, 
7
 Continuous, 1: marked by uninterrupted extension in space, time, or 
sequence, Merriam-Webster's online dictionary. 
9 
Id, at 809. Emphasis added second paragraph 
In Richards v. Pines Ranch Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977) 
which was cited by this court as authority for the definition of 
continuous use, Campbell, at 809, the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the standard set forth in 1 Thompson on Real Property, Specific 
Easement, Section 464, p. 575 (1924) as follows: 
A way may be established by prescription without direct 
evidence of its actual use during each year. A use may be continuous 
though not constant. A right of way means a right to pass over 
another's land, more or less frequently, according to the nature of the 
use to be made by the easement; and how frequently is immaterial, 
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to 
pass. It must appear not to have been interrupted by the owner of the 
land across which the right is exercised, nor voluntarily abandoned by 
the claimant. Mere intermission is not interruption. 
Campbell, at 949, emphasis added. 
During the closures of the roadway in this case, the use 
was interrupted as the public could not have used the road during 
periods of closure had they found it convenient and necessary to do so 
and for a period of time their "right to pass" over the roadway was 
indeed interrupted by the owner. Under the authority cited above, it is 
not just actual interference with particular members of the public 
attempting to use the roadway but closure of the roadway itself that 
prevents dedication under UCA § 72-5-104(1). Whether members of 
m 
the public attempted to use the roadway in question during a closure 
would be merely a matter of coincidence. 
However, in Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 
473, 556 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 for the first time this court held, that: 
In deciding whether a locked gate acted as an interruptive 
force sufficient to restart the running of the statutory ten-year period, 
the trial court should weigh the evidence regarding the duration and 
frequency that the gate was locked against the frequency and volume 
of public use to determine if there is clear and convincing evidence 
that public use of the road was continuous. 
Id. at H18, Petition for Certiorari to the Utah Supreme 
Court pending.8 Appellant joins the Okelberry petitioners believing the 
holding in Okelberry should be abandoned. 
In reaching this holding the Okelberry court treats the 
question of whether the use of the roadway is interrupted as a sliding 
scale, yet provides no rod for measurement. One would presume that 
under such a balancing test more than half of the actual use of the 
public would have to be stopped in order for a conclusion of an 
"interruptive force sufficient to restart the running of the statutory ten-
year period." Nevertheless the Court provides no time frame during 
which such interruption is to occur. Must half (or at least some 
significant but unknown percentage) of all actual traffic be stopped 
during any given ten year period? During an actual closure, such as 
8
 See addendum Utah Supreme Court Docket regarding the petition. 
11 
the 24 hour period as specifically found by the trial court, 100 percent 
of all possible traffic was prevented. During the closures the roadway 
the public was not "able to use the road whenever they found it 
necessary or convenient" Campbell, at 809 hence the use was 
interrupted and not continuous. 
The Okelberry court appears to also hold that it is 
incumbent upon the landowner to prove interruption of use by 
testimony of members of the public who were actually prevented from 
traveling on the roadway. It should be immaterial whether the road 
closures made by Appellant's predecessor in interest actually 
interrupted the travel of particular members of the public. To hold 
members of the public need have been actually halted in the act of 
traveling as opposed to the roadway itself being closed to use, results 
in the illogical conclusion that a lightly traveled road is harder to 
"interrupt" than one with more frequent use. It would indeed be 
incongruous to hold that it is the roadway's being open to public use 
which results in dedication even though the use itself is "infrequent" 
and does "not consis[t] of a great many persons," Boyer, at 109, yet 
for a closure to be an "interruption" it must meet a quantitative test of 
sufficient duration and frequency. 
1? 
The Okelberrv court cites a number of cases9 for the 
proposition that whether a roadway was blocked or gates were used, 
locked or unlocked, were mere factors in concluding whether use of a 
roadway was interrupted, Okelberrv, at 1115. This is true as far 
weighing evidence regarding the use of gates or blockages. None of 
the cases, however, stand for the proposition that once a trial court 
makes a factual finding that a roadway was indeed closed to the 
public, the duration and frequency of such closure must also be 
weighed against the amount of the actual interruption to use. It is 
respectfully suggested that the Okelberrv court confuses a trial court's 
discretion in weighing evidence and testimony before reaching factual 
conclusions and the legal conclusions based on factual findings once 
made. 
Appellant also respectfully suggests that the Okelberry 
Court has departed from the plain language of the statute and the 
precedent as set forth above. Once the trial court found the roadway 
was closed to the public for a 24-hour period every seven years during 
9
 The cases are: Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 
1981); Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 640-41 
(Utah 1972); Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 
(Utah 1964); Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT App 
285U, No. 20000559-CA, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 131, at *3-*4 (Oct. 4, 
2001) (per curiam) 
13 
the relevant time period it was compelled as a matter of law to 
conclude that it had not been "continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years" and hence, was not dedicated 
and abandoned to the public pursuant to UCA §72-5-104(1). 
In deciding whether to keep the Okelberrv balancing test 
or return to the precedent set forth above it is incumbent to keep in 
mind: 
The law does not lightly allow the transfer of property from 
private to public use. The public's taking of property in such 
circumstances as this case presents requires proof of dedication by 
clear and convincing evidence. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 
130, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (1972); Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 
377-78, 438 P.2d 545, 548 (1968). This higher standard of proof is 
demanded since the ownership of property should be granted a high 
degree of sanctity and respect. Petersen, 438 P.2d at 548—49 
(Crockett, C.J., dissenting), 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099, 
(Utah 1995). The Okelberrv approach in effect places a high burden 
upon a property owner. Once testimony is presented that the road was 
used by members of the public, (again, even though the use itself is 
"infrequent" and does "not consis[t] of a great many persons," Boyer. 
at 109), the burden then shifts to the landowner to prove not just that 
the road was closed but that the closure was sufficient to outweigh the 
remaining public use. As even recognized by the Okelberry Court: 
14 
[W]e note the difficulty property owners face in locating 
disinterested witnesses to testify that they were prevented from using 
the roads at their convenience or the time of their choosing because 
they met with a locked gate or were turned away, 
Okelberry. at 1|17. Such testimony may be of events 
decades past and be required to come from adverse witnesses with no 
motivation to come forward with testimony that would prevent their 
use of a putative public roadway. Again, Appellant does not suggest 
that a trial court does not have discretion to weigh all testimony of use 
of the roadway and weigh it against testimony that the roadway was 
closed on one or more occasions. However, once a trial court finds the 
roadway was closed to public use, as a matter of law that should 
prevent a finding that the roadway was "continuously used" under UCA 
72-5-104(1) in spite of such closure. As a practical matter the 
balancing approach announced in Okelberry promotes and favors, not 
the preservation of private property, but the transfer of private 
property to public use. 
Public interest also compels abandonment of the Okelberry 
holding. If indeed it is incumbent on a landowner to show closure of 
the roadway in question sufficient to successfully "weigh . . . against 
the frequency and volume of public use," Okelberry, at H188, 
landowners will have no choice but to close all public access to their 
15 
property or run the risk that they will not be able to meet the 
Okelberry test in a future action.10 The public will lose the use of 
private roadways and land owners will lose the ability to open their 
roadways to the public for such reasons as they may deem best to 
themselves for periods of less than ten years. Indeed in petitioning for 
leave to file an amicus brief in the Okelberry's petition for certiorari to 
the Utah Supreme Court, Brigham Young University raises similar 
public policy concerns.11 
Implied Intent to Abandon the Roadway to the Public is Still 
Required 
Historically intent of the landowner was required for a 
roadway to be abandoned to the public. In Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 
1127 (Utah 1916), the Utah supreme Court held: 
A dedication rests primarily in the intent of the owner. 
There must be a concession intentionally made by him, which may be 
proved by declarations or acts, or may be inferred from the 
circumstances. No form or ceremony is necessary. It must, however, 
appear that he knew of the use by the public, and intended to grant 
the right of way to the public, 
10
 Indeed the Trial Court suggested to Appellant that his predecessor 
in interest should have permanently closed the roadway to prevent 
creation of a public thoroughfare. R 196 at transcript p. 21. 
11
 See attached "Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief in 
Support of Petitioners," dismissed as premature pending granting or 
denial of Okelberry's Petition for Certiorari. 
16 
Id. at 1130. At that time the statute in question, Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1907 § 1115 provided: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years, 
Id at 1130. 
In Gillmore v. Carter. 351 P.2d 426 (Utah 1964) the Utah 
Supreme Court again held quoting Morris, "there must be evidence of 
intent by the owner to dedicate a road to public use . . ." Id at 428. In 
Thurman v. Bvrum, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981) the Court clarified the 
intent requirement holding: 
It is not necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer the 
road to the public as contended by defendants. Section 27—12—8912 
deems a dedication to the public as a matter of law when the required 
public use is established. See Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 92, 24 P. 799, 
800 (1890), where we said: "The intention of the owner of the land to 
dedicate may be inferred from his acquiescence in its continual use as 
a road by the public." This language was quoted with approval in 
Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901), 
Id. at 449, emphasis added. While the actual mental state 
of the owner need not be proved under Thurman, an inferred intent 
from acquiescence in the continual use by the public was still required. 
This holding was quoted in part in Bertaanole v. Pine Meadows 
Ranches, 639 P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) to rebut the contention of a 
12
 Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 § 1115 was renumbered to UCA 27-12-
89. 
17 
land owner that his "mere acquiescence" in the public use did not 
establish his intent to abandon the roadway to the public. The 
Bertanqnole court in quoting Thurman, stated "[t]here is no need to 
prove the landowner's intent" They did not however hold that intent no 
longer needed to be inferred from the "acquiescence in the continual 
use of the road by the public." That inferred intent is still a 
requirement is demonstrated by the Utah Supreme Court's return to 
the full Thurman language in Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 
P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) wherein they held: 
It is not necessary to prove that the owner of the private 
road had the intent to offer the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram, 
626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). Rather, under section 27--12--89, the 
owner's intent may be inferred by the mere acquiescence in allowing 
the public to use the road. Id.; Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow 
Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981), 
Id at 1099, emphasis added, citing Bertagnole for the 
same proposition. It must be conceded that the Utah Supreme Court 
did, in Heber City Corp. V. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 in quoting 
Morris, supra, state: 
We have subsequently abandoned interpreting into the 
language of the statute the requirement that the owner must consent 
to the dedication. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099 (citing Leo M. 
Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 
1981); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981)). 
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The Court nevertheless remains committed to the holding 
in Draper City as evidenced by the citation. Proving actual consent or 
actual intent is a higher standard than allowing intent to be merely 
inferred from the inactions of the land owner. It is this higher proof 
that is no longer required (if it ever was) for a finding of public 
dedication. It remains Utah law that the actions of the owner in 
acquiescing to the public's use of the roadway must be such to allow 
the inference of intent to abandon and dedicate the roadway to public 
use. 
There may certainly be cases where the owner subjectively 
wishes to keep the road private (or perhaps has given the matter no 
thought) but nevertheless whose actions or inactions have resulted in 
public use sufficient to compel a finding of inferred intent to abandon a 
roadway to public use. In this case, however, the Trial Court 
specifically found that the owner in question had blocked the road 
every seven years for a 24 hour period. Findings of Fact, R 176 1M3&4. 
Further, it is clear from the record that she did so with the specific 
intent of keeping the road private. R 197, transcript p. 169.13 The Trial 
Court's factual finding that the roadway had been blocked for 24 hours 
every 7 years by the owner does not allow a conclusion that the 
13
 See addendum for transcript. 
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previous owner had acquiesced in the public's use of the roadway and 
hence the required intent cannot be inferred. 
The landowner's Closing and Reopening of the Roadway 
Requires the Conclusion that the Public's use was Permissive. 
In addition to "continuous use for a period of ten years", 
for a roadway to become public under UCA 72-5-14(1) such use must 
also be as a "public thoroughfare": 
It is firmly established under Utah law that permissive use 
cannot result in either adverse possession or dedication of private 
property to the public. See, e.g., Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 3 1 1 -
12; Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449-50 (Utah 1981), 
Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 P.2d 806, at 809 (Utah 
App. 1998). The Campbell Court upheld the Trial Court's conclusion 
that opening the roadway to the public and closing it again justified a 
finding that the resulting public use was permissive and could not 
result in dedication of the roadway to the public. 
In State v. Six Mile Ranch Co.. 2006 UT App 104, this 
court recognized the holding in Campbell stating: 
The trial court properly relied upon Campbell for the 
proposition that an overt act, such as locking and unlocking a gate, 
provides evidence of permissive use, 
Id. at 1)23. In the case at bar, the Trial court made the express factual 
finding that the previous owner, Mrs. George, had blocked the 
9ft 
roadway every seven years for a 24 hour period. The express reason 
of blocking the road was to retain ownership. R 197, transcript p. 169. 
Because of Mrs. George's express and uncontroverted acts in closing 
and opening the roadway, as a matter of law, the members of the 
public which used the road did so with her implied permission. As a 
result it was not used as a "public thoroughfare" and no dedication to 
the public was made. 
Conclusion 
Given the Trial Court's factual finding that the roadway in 
question was blocked for a 24 hour period, and given the fact that it is 
undisputed that such action was taken specifically to prevent 
dedication of the roadway to the public, Appellant requests the 
following relief: 
1) A holding that as a matter of law there was not a 
continuous use of the roadway for 10 years, as defined under Utah 
law; 
2) A holding that intent to abandon the roadway is still 
required under Utah law and such intent cannot be inferred from the 
land owner's actions; 
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3) A holding that the land owners' actions compel a finding 
that the public's use of the roadway was permissive and that such use 
was not as a "public thoroughfare" preventing the legal conclusion that 
the roadway was dedicated to the public use; and, 
4) That the case be reversed and remanded to the Trial 
Court to enter Judgment in favor of Appellant. 
oo 
DATED AND SIGNED this f_S_ day A ^ W A 2007. 
r 
Jeff Peatross 
Ranney and Peatross 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Prisbrey 
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Bryan J. Pattison 
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Ranney and Peatross 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Prisbrey 
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Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law 
Heath H. Snow, Esq., Utah Bar #8563 
BINGHAM & SNOW, LLP 
Attorney for Town of Leeds 
230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l 
St. George, Utah 84790 
(435) 656-1900 phone 
(435) 656-1963 fax 
www.binghamsnow.com 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF LEEDS, a Utah municipal 
corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY PRISBREY, an individual: 
DEFENDANT DOES and all other persons or 
entities unknown claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the pleading adverse to 
the complainant's ownership, or clouding their 
title thereto, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.: 060500408 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
The above-captioned parties, present in person and by legal counsel came on before the 
Court on the 20th day of July, 2006 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. for the conclusion of a temporary 
restraining order hearing which first commenced on March 28, 2006 and was continued in the 
form of an evidentiary hearing on May 4,2006. Having considered the testimonial, documentary 
and other evidence and the argument of counsel, the Court hereby makes the following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L Within the Town of Leeds there exists a roadway named West Center 
Street ("West Center Street") originating at an intersection with Main Street (Old 
Highway 91) and extending North to the crest of a small incline and then down hill across 
certain real property currently owned by the Defendant (the "Subject Property") to a 
narrow "Box" underpass underneath Interstate 15 to an area known as Angel Springs. 
2. The Box underpass was constructed at the same time that Interstate 15 was 
constructed in 1964-65 at which time West Center Street was repositioned to its present 
location. 
3. Mrs. Joann George and her family owned the Subject Property prior to 
Defendant's purchase in approximately 2000. 
4. In October of every year for seven years, beginning in October of 1964, 
and again in October of 71, 78, 85, 92, and finally in 99, that Mrs. George either solo, or 
with the assistance of her sons, went to the road [West Center Street] in question and at 
the peak of the road, which is on Exhibit No. 7, the juncture of a "Y," established a 
roadblock for twenty-four hours, and she guarded that road in that fashion every seven 
years for twenty-four hours. 
5. The roadblocks generally consisted of her or her sons' physical presence 
and placing sawhorses across the road. 
6. That from the testimony of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Beal, Mr. Peine, Mr. Lott, 
Mr. Goddard, and Chief Lewis that from 1966 until 1996 this road was open, unblocked 
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with the exception of the 24-hour roadblocks, and available to the public without any 
inhibition of travel with possible exception of times during sorghum boiling. 
7. During her 24-hour road blockades, Mrs. George never encountered 
anyone in the process and cannot testify that she knew of anyone who was precluded 
from traveling along the road because of her blockades. 
8. From 1966 through 1996, members of the public used West Center Street 
whenever they found it necessary and/or convenient and without the need of obtaining 
permission. 
9. Recently, the Defendant, who claims West Center Street is a private road, 
has attempted to restrict travel across the same by erecting a chain link fence across the 
road at the southernmost edge of the Subject Property and at the entrance into the "Box" 
tunnel. 
10. Defendant also affixed two no trespassing signs on the chain link fence. 
11. As a result of Defendant's actions, the Town of Leeds filed this action 
seeking to have West Center Street deemed a dedicated public right of way pursuant to § 
72-5-104(1). and sought a temporary restraining order and injunction enjoining 
Defendant from obstructing West Center Street and destroying any portion thereof, and 
specifically requiring Defendant to remove the gates and signage constructed across the 
road. 
Based on these findings of fact, the court makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This is an action by Plaintiff, the Town of Leeds, to have West Center deemed a 
dedicated public right of way pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1), which provides that CwA 
highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare for a period often years." 
2. Three factors must be present for a road to become a public highway by 
dedication under Section 72-5-104(1): (i) continuous use (ii) as a public thoroughfare (iii) for a 
period often years. 
3. Members of the public traveled West Center Street from 1966 to 1996 as often as 
they found it convenient or necessary, at times chosen by them and, therefore, the public's use of 
West Center Street was continuous during that period of time. 
4. From 1966 to 1996, there was not sufficient action taken to adequately put the 
public on notice either that permission was needed to use West Center Street nor was there 
sufficient action taken by Mrs. George to obstruct the public's free and unrestricted passing and 
travel on West Center Street; therefore West Center Street was as a public thoroughfare. 
5. The continuous use of West Center Street as a public thoroughfare was made for a 
period often years (1966 to 1996). 
6. Based on clear and convincing evidence provided to the Court, West Center Street 
is a dedicated public road pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). 
7. Because the parties, through counsel, stipulated that the evidentiary hearings and 
argument on the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction should be consolidated 
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with the trial of the action on the merits, and because the Court finds clear and convincing 
evidence that the West Center Street is a dedicated public road pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-
5-104(1), judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Town of Leeds that West Center Street is a 
dedicated public right of way. 
8. Defendant is hereby ordered to remove any obstruction and signage constructed 
across West Center Street and is permanently enjoined from taking any further action to block or 
otherwise inhibit vehicular or pedestrian traffic from traveling on West Center Street. 
SO ENTERED this ^ J day of October 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
James L. Shumate 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: £, ? ^ S 
RANNEY & PEATROSS 
^ 
"JeffPeatross 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Judgment 
Heath H. Snow, Esq., Utah Bar #8563 
BINGHAM & SNOW, LLP 
Attorney for Town of Leeds 
230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l 
St. George, Utah 84790 
(435) 656-1900 phone 
(435) 656-1963 fax 
www.binghamsDow.com 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF LEEDS, a Utah municipal 
corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY PRISBREY, an individual: 
DEFENDANT DOES and all other persons or 
entities unknown claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the pleading adverse to 
the complainant's ownership, or clouding their 
title thereto, 
Defendants. 
The above-captioned parties, present in person and by legal counsel came on before the 
Court on the 20th day of July, 2006 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. for the conclusion of a temporary 
restraining order hearing which first commenced on March 28, 2006 and was continued in the 
form of an evidentiary hearing on May 4, 2006. Having considered the testimonial, 
documentary and other evidence and the argument of counsel and having the made separate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are entered concurrently herewith, and for 
good cause showing: 
1 
JUDGMENT 
(Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief) 
Civil No.: 060500408 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the Plaintiff, the Town of Leeds, that the historic right of way commonly 
known as West Center Street is a dedicated public right of way pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
72-5-104(1). That a certified copy of this Judgment may be recorded in the Official Records 
of Washington County maintained in the Office of the Recorder, Washington County, State of 
Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant, Terry Prisbrey, and all agents, successors and assigns are hereby permanently 
enjoined from taking any action to block or otherwise inhibit vehicular or pedestrian traffic 
along West Center Street. 
SO ORDERED this J~ ^  day of £ , rT" 2006 
BY THE COURT 
James L. Shumate ^ v \ 
District Court Judge 
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1 either two by eight or two by ten from the old mills when they 
2 really were two by tens, and we put them across. But there was 
3 really not a problem because the only one going over would be 
4 Uncle Max or Uncle Willard or — not Uncle Willard. He has 
5 passed on. Uncle Max and his family, and there were some others, 
6 but we had no trouble at that time. 
7 THE COURT: Where did you place the obstructions? 
8 THE WITNESS: Right — it's hard to see the elevation 
9 here, but I am presuming that that would be the high mark right 
10 there. 
11 THE COURT: At the peak of the elevation right at the 
12 top of the hill? 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, the peak of the elevation. 
14 THE COURT: So you could see it from either side? 
15 THE WITNESS: Either side. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 THE WITNESS: I only --
18 THE COURT: How many two by tens were used; do you 
19 remember? 
20 THE WITNESS: Pardon me? 
21 THE COURT: How many two by tens were used? 
22 THE WITNESS: I think only one. Who wanted to carry 
23 more than that? 
24 THE COURT: And a couple of saw horses, one on each end? 
25 Was there any kind of sign placed on it? 
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1 THE WITNESS: Just "no trespassing." 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 THE WITNESS: Somewhat weathered. 
4 J THE COURT: And you would have put that there in 
5 September of 1964? 
6 THE WITNESS: (Non-verbal response) 
7 THE COURT: How long was it there? 
8 THE WITNESS: Until we took it down 24 hours later. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 THE WITNESS: Actually, we didn't know we didn't have to 
11 be there. My two sons and I spelled one another off through the 
12 night. In some ways it was — they thought it was quite 
13 exciting. 
14 THE COURT: Your purpose, then, was to block the road — 
15 THE WITNESS: For a full 24 hours. 
16 THE COURT: Stand guard duty, as it were? 
17 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. 
18 THE COURT: Even though you didn't know you didn't have 
19 to. Okay. That's all right. Sometimes we do silly things. 
20 THE WITNESS: After that I returned with my family 
21 August 14th, 1971, and the boys and I agaxn — the boys were 
22 hoping to be taken deer hunting by someone. They weren't. 
23 We spent that night the day of the evening before deer hunt. 
24 Everyone had buck fever. No one — 
25 THE COURT: I think you said August, but you must have 
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A. In 1999 I was right there. 
Q. Okay. 
THE COURT: At the bottom of the hill right in the mouth 
of the culvert, Counsel. 
THE WITNESS: That's right, with my arms folded. 
Q. BY MR. HEIDEMAN: When you were performing this sentry 
duty did you believe that the City of Leeds had obtained 
ownership to the property? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I felt — I don't know that law that well, Mr. Heideman, 
but according to our family tradition as long as we blocked it we 
remained the owners. We certainly were paying the taxes on it. 
Q. Do you continue or did you continue to pay the taxes 
until the property was transferred to another owner? 
A. Yes, paid the taxes until it was sold to Mr. Prisbrey. 
Q. With regard to the sorghum factory, are you aware of the 
existence of that factory? 
A. More like an old mill. 
Q. Okay. Sorghum old mill. With regard to that, there was 
some 
your 
side 
testimony that that sorghum — am I saying that correctly, 
Honor? 
THE COURT: G-u~m, counsel. There is no "r" on that 
of the "g." 
MR. HEIDEMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
Brigham Young University: Motion to file amicus 
[Okelberry] 
Michael R. Orme 
General Counsel 
Brigham Young University 
A-357 ASB 
Provo, UT 84602 
801-422-3089 
Attorney for Brigham Young University 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH COUNTY, 
Appellant and Respondent, 
vs. 
E. RAY OKELBERRY, et. al„ 
Appellees and Petitioners. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITIONERS 
Supreme Court No. 20070011 
Court of Appeals No. 20050389 
Brigham Young University (BYU) moves this Court for an order allowing BYU to file an 
amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners in this case. 
BYU has an interest in this case because it owns private property within the state of Utah 
with private roads that connect to public highways. For example, several roads across BYU's 
Provo campus begin and end beyond BYU's private property and are potentially subject to 
abandonment and dedication under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5-104(1). BYU desires a 
predictable and clear rule, easily applicable ex ante, that determines when roads across private 
property become abandoned and dedicated public highways. 
An amicus brief is desirable in this case to explain how the decision of the Court of 
Appeals will affect private property owners in urban and suburban areas. The Court of Appeals 
instructed trial courts to "weigh the evidence regarding duration and frequency that the gate was 
locked against the frequency and volume of public use" to establish abandonment. Wasatch 
County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, f 18. Particularly in high-traffic areas, such as around 
BYU's Provo campus, infusing variables of traffic frequency and volume into the statutory 
analysis will only complicate the inquiry of whether the road "has been continuously used." 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). A private property owner will be unable, by fencing or gating 
roads periodically during the 10-year abandonment time frame, to ensure that its private roads 
are not abandoned to the public. This is particularly the case if trial courts have wide latitude in 
determining whether public use is permissive. 
An amicus brief is also desirable to demonstrate potential unintended consequences of the 
balancing test set forth by the Court of Appeals. Private property owners, without the guidance 
of a bright-line rule that allows both for public use and for protection of private property rights, 
will need to increasingly restrict, or totally exclude, the public from their roads in order to protect 
their property rights. 
DATED this 9th day of February, 2007. 
MICHAEL R. ORME 
Attorney for Brigham Young University 
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